A quantitative approach to conduct a specific type of stress test on road networks is presented in this article. The objective is to help network managers determine whether their networks would perform adequately during and after the occurrence of hazard events. Conducting a stress test requires (i) modifying an existing risk model (i.e., a model to estimate the probable consequences of hazard events) by representing at least one uncertainty in the model with values that are considerably worse than median or mean values, and (ii) developing criteria to conclude if the network has an adequate post-hazard performance. Specifically, the stress test conducted in this work is focused on the uncertain behavior of individual objects that are part of a network when these are subjected to hazard loads. Here, the relationships between object behavior and hazard load are modeled using fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions. To illustrate the quantitative approach, a stress test is conducted for an example road network in Switzerland, which is affected by floods and rainfall-triggered mudflows. Beyond the focus of the stress test, this work highlights the importance of using a probabilistic approach when conducting stress tests for temporal and spatially distributed networks.
Introduction
Managers of networks (often also referred to as infrastructure; e.g., road, drinking water distribution, or power transmission) rely on a variety of methods to estimate their network-related risk (i.e., probable consequences) due to the occurrence of (natural) hazard events (e.g., floods, landslides, and earthquakes). The estimation of risk is the initial step in determining if the network would have an adequate post-hazard (physical and functional) performance-assuming that such a performance is measured in terms of riskand if risk-reducing interventions are necessary. Examples of risk include:
• those related to physical performance such as the probable cost of restoring individual structures, which are here referred to as objects (e.g., bridges, water pipes, or transmission towers), and • those related to functional performance such as the probable cost absorbed by society because of changes in the network's level of service, which is here referred to as network functional capacity (e.g., connectivity between two points in the network).
Quantitative risk assessment methods offer an advantage over qualitative methods: the numerical characterization of the events and their relationships needed to estimate risk, which leads to a more refined estimation. As suggested by Hackl, Heitzler [1] , who built on the work of Adey, Hajdin [2] , these events can be classified as source, hazard, object, network and societal events. , ������� ) events. Each of these-noted by an overbar-is a vector of events, or a vector of a Cartesian product of events when more than one event per category is of interest (e.g., earthquake hazard and earthquake-triggered landslide hazard). Events, and therefore scenarios, are linked to probabilities of occurrence. To accomplish this simulation, the risk model includes a number of sub-models that simulate individual events and their corresponding relationships.
When considering a large range of possible events along with their probabilities of occurrence given a desired set of scenarios, the output risk will be a distribution-for the purpose of the following illustration, it is here assumed that a risk model can estimate a distribution like the one presented in Figure 1 . When a network manager can describe adequate post-hazard performance for the network in terms of risk, then this information can be used to interpret the resulting risk distribution. Adequate post-hazard performance can be evaluated against:
• a consequence indicator (i.e., the type of consequence that the network manager would use to measure performance; e.g., average additional travel time per vehicle immediately after the occurrence of a hazard event, cost of repairs), • a consequence limit [i.e., the maximum consequence that the network manager would accept to observe if a hazard event occurs; e.g., a 10% increase in the average additional travel time per vehicle within the month following the occurrence of a hazard event, cost of repairs amounting to 0.1% of the regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP)], and • the non-exceedance probability of that consequence limit (i.e., the probability that an observed consequence resulting from a hazard event will not exceed the consequence limit; e.g., a 90% probability that at most a 10% increase in the average additional travel time per vehicle in the Lam , J.C., Adey, B.T., Heitzler, M., Hackl, J., Gehl, P. , van Erp, N., D'Ayala, D., van Gelder, P., Hurni, L. (2018). Stress tests for a road network using fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 173, 78-93. 10 .1016/j.ress.2018.01.015.
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month following the hazard event will be observed, a 95% probability that at most the cost of repairs will amount to 0.1% of the regional GDP).
To illustrate this, Figure 1 shows: a consequence limit (vertical dotted line) and a calculated 90% nonexceedance probability (ratio between the green area under the curve and the entire area under the curve). Given this information, network managers would need to decide whether a 90% non-exceedance probability means that risk-reducing interventions should be executed, or not.
When the composition of the risk model changes, then the network manager can expect to obtain a different risk distribution, and therefore, observe a different consequence limit non-exceedance probability. Changes can occur when network managers are seeking to:
• reduce the uncertainty of the results due to improved knowledge, for example: o the execution of a traffic load analysis to determine the load carrying capacity of a bridge in the network after a simulated earthquake event rather than the use of a capacity heuristically approximated by experienced bridge engineers when computer support increases, or o the replacement of a macro traffic sub-model for a micro traffic sub-model when the resolution of the analysis is part of a city and more data are available, or • better quantify the uncertainty, for example:
o the consideration of a larger number of possible hazard events by extending the maximum considered return period, o the random application of interchangeable ground motion prediction equations (GMPEs) during the modeling of the earthquake event, or o the characterization of the number of available crews for post-hazard restoration interventions by a probability distribution instead of using an expected quantity.
In these cases, which this work refers to as model updating, the consequence limit should remain the same despite changes in the estimated risk. Figure 2 shows the illustrative distribution with reduced uncertainty as well as the reevaluation of risk based on the same consequence limit. It is here observed that the new consequence limit non-exceedance probability is 97%. This means that network managers may be now more inclined to not execute interventions to reduce risk.
Figure 2 Illustrative updated risk distribution
A network manager can also change a risk model by representing at least one uncertainty (i.e., an uncertain element of the risk model; i.e., events, relationships, parameters) with a subset of probable values (i.e., a probable realization of the uncertain element). This work refers to this process as model conditioning.
Clear examples include, but are not limited to the following (note the parallel between these examples and those cited previously when referring to improving the quantification of uncertainty):
• the selection of specific events resulting in changes to the scenario space (e.g., including only lowprobability, high-consequence hazard events), • the integration of a sub-model that gives more conservative or less conservative relationships (e.g., using a GMPE that generally provides the most conservative results for short distances when the area of concerned is near the modeled seismogenic source), and • the use of upper or lower bound uncertain parameters, or parameters from a distribution that match a specific percentile (e.g., using the minimum number of crews thought to be available for post-hazard restoration interventions).
When conditioning a model, a network manager should expect to obtain a different risk distribution, and therefore, determine the new consequence limit and non-exceedance probability of that consequence limit based on the conditions applied to the model. For example, generally, the consequence limit for a hazard event with a 50-year return period should not be the same as the consequence limit corresponding to a hazard event with a 500-year return period. This is illustrated in Figure 3 . It is observed that when conditioned, the risk model, along with the changed consequence limit, leads to a consequence limit nonexceedance probability of 85%. This means that network managers may be now more inclined to actually execute an intervention to reduce risk. Possible new consequence limits will depend on the infrastructure sector and the priorities and contexts of the network managers in addition to the conditions applied to the risk model.
Figure 3 Illustrative conditioned risk distribution
The next section presents an approach for conducting a special type of assessment that uses conditioned risk models. These assessments are referred to as stress tests. The general approach is consistent with the work of van Erp, Linger [3] and van Erp, Linger [4] , who, from a probability theoretical point of view, stated that stress tests involve the construction of conditional consequence probability distributions. Considering that networks are temporal and spatially distributed, a probabilistic approach helps to account for the possible ways events can occur over time and space (e.g., a hazard event of a given return period can manifest in various ways over a geographic area). A deterministic approach (here defined as an approach that aims at evaluating the adequacy of the post-hazard performance of a network based on a specific scenario; i.e., one combination of events) presents limitations on this regard and the decision on whether to intervene or not depends heavily on the selection of the scenario.
The next section moves from a general approach to conducting stress tests to a more specific one that focuses on using risk models, whose conditions are related to the uncertain behavior of individual objects that are part of a network when subjected to hazard loads. An example is then presented to demonstrate the application of the specific stress test approach. The example includes:
• a short introduction to the problem statement,
• an overview of the risk model,
• the definition of the stress test conducted,
• descriptions of the functions used to relate object behavior and hazard load,
• an overview of the additional key data needed to understand the outputs of the risk model,
• the estimated risk of the stress test conducted, and • an evaluation to determine the need to execute risk-reducing interventions.
This work closes with a discussion on the application of the approach and a summary of the work and an outline of future research steps.
It is worth noting that stress tests have been commonly used in non-infrastructure sectors (e.g., financial and healthcare) and sometimes used in infrastructure sectors (e.g., nuclear and transport) to model and evaluate adverse outcomes, not necessarily risk due to hazard events. For example, Li, Yu [5] and Mercier, Crozet [6] applied stress tests to estimate the sufficiency of network flow capacities and changes in mobility behavior. Furthermore, Lambert, Tsang [7] , You, Connelly [8] , Hamilton, Lambert [9] and Thorisson, Lambert [10] applied various types of stress tests to:
• estimate the performance of portfolios of highway equipment, highway, coastal flood risk and storm damage reduction, and electric power projects, respectively, • determine the implied changes in the prioritization of these projects, and • identify the critical stress tests based on their assessed impacts.
Avdeeva and van Gelder [11] compiled a list of stress tests conducted in various sectors. Only one set of examples found in the literature review relates to the work presented here because of its focus on hazards: the post-Fukushima stress tests conducted at individual European Union nuclear power plants [12] . The European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group [13] described the specifications of the deterministic stress tests conducted for European Union nuclear power plants.
Stress tests

General approach
A stress test is a quantitative assessment designed to evaluate the ability of a network to perform adequately during and after the occurrence of hazard events, where the assessment is conducted using a risk model that is conditioned on representing at least one uncertainty in the model with values that are considerably worse than the corresponding median or mean values. The characteristic "considerably worse" implies that the selected values would lead to a significantly larger risk estimation. On purpose, this characteristic is not further qualified here to acknowledge that the task of selecting the values to use in a stress test belongs to the network manager.
The conditions imposed on the risk model demand an understanding of the physical system being analyzed to determine the continued adequacy of the remaining elements of the model (e.g., when conditioning the risk model to estimate the risk due to high-consequence, low-probability hazard events, it is necessary to evaluate whether the hazard model used in the original model is still a suitable model to simulate such hazard events). Moreover, in establishing the conditions to the risk model, it should be kept in mind that an increasing number of conditions, in general, decreases the ability of the network manager to consider uncertainties, and therefore, increases the difficulty to determine suitable post-hazard performance evaluation criteria.
Post-hazard performance is still evaluated against a consequence indicator, a consequence limit, and the non-exceedance probability of that consequence limit. As in the case of model conditions, this work provides no prescribed guidance on the selection of appropriate evaluation criteria as this activity also belongs to the network manager. It is plausible to imagine, however, that network managers will select:
• consequence indicators and consequence limits that are aligned with strategic goals, contractual agreements, and policies and regulations, among others, and • a large non-exceedance probability of the consequence limit (e.g., two-standard deviations) to reflect a level of certainty conducive to firm decisions on whether or not to plan and execute riskreducing interventions.
Finally, in cases where there is a need to consider more than one consequence indicator, these need to be explicitly explained. This may occur when needing to (i) evaluate multiple performance measures, (ii) disaggregate the results of a given performance measure (e.g., for each cascading hazard, for each part of network, for each network category), or (iii) evaluate multiple non-cascading hazard events. The following is an example. Two consequence indicators are of interest: (i) the average additional travel time per vehicle in the month following the occurrence of a hazard event on high-speed roads, and (ii) the average additional travel time per vehicle in the month following the occurrence of a hazard event on local roads. The consequence limit is set to be 10% for additional travel time on high-speed roads, or 20% for additional travel time on local roads. The non-exceedance probability is 90% for both cases. The network manager also has the following additional combined post-hazard performance evaluation criteria: a 90% probability that at most a 5% for additional travel time on high-speed roads and a 15% for additional travel time on local roads are observed at the same time.
Stress tests using fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions
The specific type of stress tests presented in this work is focused on the uncertain behavior of individual objects that are part of a network when these are subjected to hazard loads. One of the conditions imposed on the risk model is to represent in a quantitative manner this uncertain hazard-object relationship using upper-percentile fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions rather than the respective median functions, which is a common practice in risk assessments. The usefulness of conditioning a risk model in this manner is that, once the stress test is passed, the network manager has an increased confidence that actual consequences will likely not exceed the accepted limit. In other words, conditioning helps to take into consideration potential deviations in the modeling of network performance, serving a similar purpose to that of safety factors in structural engineering.
Fragility functions relate hazard intensity measures to the probabilities of meeting or exceeding a specific object damage state. These functions are widely used in risk assessments, including those concerning road networks (e.g., Clarke, Lam [14] ). A set of functions is illustrated in Figure 4 , where three damage states are defined. Fragility functions have been extensively researched by several authors, including D'Ayala, Gehl [15] , Porter [16] and Rossetto, Ioannou [17] .
Figure 4 Illustrative fragility functions
Functional capacity loss functions relate hazard intensity measures to various losses in levels of service provided by objects. An illustrative functional form is presented in Figure 5 , and specific examples can be found in Lam and Adey [18] . In that work, a distinction is made between (i) initial functional capacity loss, which represents the loss during the hazard event period and the initial part of the restoration period until a restoration intervention is executed, and (ii) functional capacity loss during restoration, which represents the loss during the execution of the restoration intervention (e.g., closure of a bridge for repairs). This family of functions is less common than fragility functions. Most works that have sought to establish a direct relationship between loss of level of service and hazard intensity measures have limited this relationship to be represented by binary or step functions (e.g. Kermanshah, Karduni [19] ).
Figure 5 Illustrative functional capacity loss function
Fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions as those presented in Figure 4 and Figure 5 are the median representations of an uncertain relationship between hazard events and object events. Figure  6 displays illustrative bounds for unspecified upper and lower-percentiles. Sources of uncertainty include, but are not limited to:
• estimating the behavior of the object when subjected to a hazard load (e.g., the type of seismic analysis for a network bridge), • modeling the uncertain parameters required to simulate the response of the object (e.g., the probability distribution thought to describe the value of a parameter), • defining the damage states in the case of fragility functions [e.g., (i) damage states based on determined functional capacity losses, (ii) object element and/or damage measure that help(s) describe the damage states, and (iii) damage state thresholds for the chosen damage measure], and • fitting the resulting damage state exceedance probabilities and loss of level of service (e.g., the probability distribution thought to describe the form of the function).
Figure 6 Illustrative (a) fragility functions and (b) functional capacity loss function with uncertainty bounds
The use of upper-percentile functions in stress tests leads to an increase in damage state exceedance probabilities and in loss of service, which at the same time lead to an increased risk estimation. As described here, fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions have not been used previously in stress tests for road networks.
An example upper percentile is 95. This is the percentile used in the estimation of the high-confidence low-probability failure (HCLPF) capacity of selected nuclear power plant elements as part of a plant seismic margin assessment. HCLPF capacity is an indicator of the level of seismic safety of an element and is equivalent to the seismic intensity measure that corresponds to a 5% exceedance probability of plant failure (damage state) when using the 95-percentile fragility function that describes the probability of plant failure [20] . While the consequences of road network failure are not considered larger than those of nuclear power plants, using 95-percentile fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions could be justified for road networks knowing the critical services that these networks provide during and after a 3. Example definition
Introduction
The example demonstrates how a road network manager can first develop a risk model for a road network with a probability of being affected by floods and rainfall-triggered mudflows using the risk model of Hackl, Heitzler [1] . Then, the example shows how the network manager can define and implement a stress test by choosing to model hazard events of a specific return period and using 95-percentile fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions.
Problem statement
The Rhine Valley area around Chur, Switzerland in the Canton of Grisons was suspected to have a road network with inadequate performance when subjected to floods and rainfall-triggered mudflows.
Historical records and previous studies suggest that these hazards are of high concern. The road network in the area of study, which plays an important role in the economy of the eastern part of Switzerland, consists of 32 km of high-speed roads, 559 km of local roads (primary roads and roads of lower category), and 92 bridges, with many of these objects exposed to the hazards of interest.
Loads related to flooding may be categorized as hydrostatic, hydrodynamic and impact [21] . These loads can be similarly associated with specific object events: inundation, bearing capacity degradation (hydrostatic), scour, erosion and hydraulic loading (hydrodynamic) and debris impact (impact) [22] . Loads generated by landslides depend on the type of landslide (e.g., falls, topples, flows, spreads) and material (e.g., rocks, soil, mud). Resulting object events range from obstruction to destruction, with potential damages to various non-structural and structural elements. The types of object events in this example are: (i) bridge local scour (at piers only), (ii) road section mudflow-blocking (i.e., blockage of a road section due to mudflow deposits), and (iii) road section inundation, all of which had been observed in the area of study.
Risk model
The detailed quantitative and computer-supported model used to estimate the road network-related risk is described in Hackl, Heitzler [1] . Here, only a summary of the risk model (with an improved workflow) is introduced.
Events and spatial and temporal boundaries
The events included in the risk model along with their temporal boundaries are presented in Table 2 . In the model, there were two distinctive time periods: (i) during hazard events, and (ii) during restoration. The length of the former period was determined by the modeling of the source and hazard events (in hourly time units). Object events, network events and societal events were also modeled during the hazard events period to evaluate the performance of the road network. The restoration period occurred once the hazard event period ended, and continued until all objects in need of a restoration intervention were restored to their original condition (in daily time units). During the restoration period, network and societal events were modeled. The period of analysis was assumed to last one full year, and within this period, a maximum of one scenario was considered to occur.
Event category Types of events Temporal boundary
• Rainfall events of return periods ranging from 1 to 10,000 years
• Rainfall events were considered to fall within the period of analysis of one year. These events were assumed to last no more than three days. The spatial boundaries of the selected events are shown in Figure 7 . This is an author generated post-print version (also known as "post-refereeing print" and "accepted manuscript") of the article:
Lam, J.C., Adey, B.T., Heitzler, M., Hackl, J., Gehl, P. , van Erp, N., D'Ayala, D., van Gelder, P., Hurni, L. 
Relationships and scenarios
The relationships linking the selected events into scenarios are described in Table 3 . Scenarios, as defined earlier, were built based on the combination of the events listed in Table 2 . A given rainfall event resulted in floods as well as cascading mudflows given the estimations of a runoff sub-model and the application of a rainfall intensity-duration function, respectively. The hazard events, which were represented by spatio-temporally-distributed intensity measures, resulted in a series of levels of bridge local scour, mudflow-blocked road sections and inundated road sections, which were estimated through the application of fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions. The network functional capacity at various time steps was determined based on the estimated conditions of individual objects and the network topology, which helped spatially connect these objects. At the end of the hazard events period, restoration interventions were simulated to be executed. The order of execution was determined based on least expected restoration time (i.e., the intervention that was the fastest to complete was executed first). This criterion was used as a proxy for improvement in network functional capacity. It was assumed that multiple interventions could be executed at the same time, depending on the number of work crews. Throughout the hazard event period and restoration period, and therefore, at various network functional capacity states, traffic changes-measured in terms of additional travel time and missed trips-were modeled with the aid of an Origin-Destination matrix that related vehicle flow to the changing road network. A total of 1,180 scenarios were modeled as part of the original risk assessment.
Relationship category Types of relationships
Source-Hazard • Runoff for floods to estimate how much rainfall could not be absorbed by the environment, affecting river discharge • Intensity-duration function for the cascading mudflows to determine the combination of rainfall intensity and duration needed to trigger mudflows Hazard-Object
• Fragility functions for bridge local scour that related river discharge with the probability of reaching or exceeding a given damage state • Fragility functions for mudflow-blocked road sections that related mudflow volume with the probability of reaching or exceeding a given damage state • Functional capacity loss functions for inundated road sections that related inundation depth with a feasible speed Object-Network
• Network topology to understand how objects were spatially connected and how functional capacity losses were to be aggregated from the object level to the network level Object-Societal
• Restoration prioritization based on the condition of individual objects to schedule the needed restoration interventions Network-Societal
• Origin-Destination matrix to understand which vehicles were moving, and where these were starting their trips and where these were traveling to Table 3 Relationships Figure 8 and Figure 9 illustrate the workflow of the risk model using Business Process Model and Notation. The hazard sub-models ( Figure 8 ) included three different sets of activities. The first set (highlighted in dark green) consisted of initially modeling a series of rainfall events using pre-determined spatio-temporal precipitation fields from Wüest, Frei [23] , as well as the resulting runoff and discharge scenarios using the ModClark model [24] . The second set of activities (highlighted in dark blue) determined whether the resulting discharge scenario corresponded to the discharge value of a desired return period, which was estimated based on available gauge data. Calibration of the rainfall event (i.e., upscale, downscale of pre-determined spatio-temporal precipitation fields) was executed if the desired return period was not achieved. The third set of activities (highlighted in dark red) completed the modeling of the hazard by simulating the flood event using a 1D steady and gradually-varied flow model, as well as the cascading mudflow events using geometries from Losey and Wehrli [25] and an intensity-duration function from Zimmermann, Mani [26] . More details on the sub-models can be found in Hackl, Heitzler [27] .
Sub-models
Figure 8 Hazard sub-models
The damage and consequence sub-models ( Figure 9 ) included four distinctive groups of activities. The first group (highlighted in light gold) obtained the output intensities of the hazard events to estimate (i) the probabilities of objects being in different damage states using fragility functions, and (ii) the reduction of speed for inundated roads using functional capacity loss functions. For bridge local scour and road section mudflow-blocking, the probabilities of damage states along with estimations of corresponding functional capacity losses, restoration times and costs (i.e., referred to as consequence parameters in Figure 9 ) were used as indicated by Lam and Adey [18] to determine expected restoration cost, restoration time and functional capacity loss estimates at the object level. For road section inundation, reduction of speed along with estimated restoration times and costs based on inundation depths were assigned to road sections.
The second group (highlighted in light blue) consisted on iteratively modeling the network functional capacity over time and running a recursive inspection and restoration algorithm described in Lam and Adey [18] to obtain the time-varying network states that were used in the third group of activities. In this group (highlighted in light orange), the degradation and recovery of traffic were modeled. This simulation was based on a macroscopic traffic model founded on the Method of Successive Averages [28] and a gravitybased Origin-Destination matrix founded on population data. Finally, the fourth group (highlighted in light green) calculated the probable direct consequences (i.e., costs that the network manager incurs; e.g., cost of restoration) and indirect consequences (i.e., costs that the network users incur; e.g., costs of traffic changes) during the hazard events and during the restoration periods. While direct consequences were estimated based on aggregated restoration costs, indirect consequences were quantified in terms of cost resulting from additional travel time through the network and missed trips. 
Stress test definition
The stress test conditions were:
• using 95-percentile fragility functions for bridge local scour and road section mudflow-blocking, • using 95-percentile functional capacity loss functions for inundated road sections, and • running 100 simulations of rainfall events with a 500-year return period.
While pavement sections are typically designed for up to 100-year return period events, bridge piers are generally designed for 500-year return period events. Selecting the former return period for the analysis would have resulted in the exclusion of bridge local scour as an object event as one could have deemed such a return period to be non-critical for that specific event. Selecting a return period higher than 500 years could have also been appropriate and such selection would have depended on other factors besides design return periods, including but not limited to an initiative to look specifically at events with relatively larger return periods (i.e., high-consequence, low-probability events).
The evaluation criteria is presented in Table 4 . The 2016 GDP was projected using data from the Federal Statistical Office [29] .
Consequence indicator
Consequence limit
Non-exceedance probability Note on setting the consequence limit 
95%
An average annual loss-GDP ratio of 1% is typically large enough to require risk-reducing interventions. Table 4 Evaluation criteria Note 4.1: Average annual loss was defined as the expected restoration cost of damaged objects per year averaged over a very long period of time when considering the probable hazard events that may occur during this period.
Fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions
This section briefly presents the fragility functions used for bridge local scour and road section mudflowblocking, as well as the functional capacity loss functions for inundated road sections. The full description of the methods and data used for the development of the functions can be found in Hackl, Heitzler [1] .
Fragility function for bridges local scour
Five bridges in the area of study were identified to be prone to local scour. Based on available data, these bridges were classified into two categories: (i) type A with one pier, and (ii) type B with two piers. Examples are presented in Figure 10 . To construct the fragility functions for bridge local scour, the method proposed by Gehl and D'Ayala [32] , D'Ayala, Gehl [15] and Gehl and D'Ayala [33] was used with several modifications (e.g., use of local scour equations found in Arneson, Zevenbergen [34] as opposed to those found in Richardson and Davis [35] ). The damage states used in this analysis are described in Table 5 . Due to lack of data, the damage states (i.e., 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 ) were defined by comparing the calculated local scour depth ( ) with a sampled percentage (i.e., 1 , 2 , 3 ) of an assumed critical depth of local scour (i.e., level of scour where the bridge is not physically deemed to be safe for traffic; i.e., ).
Damage state Initial functional capacity loss Threshold definition Parameter definition
Full closure ≥ 3 • Table 5 Damage states for bridge local scour A total of 100,000 points were estimated for each damage state, each of which represented a relationship between discharge and a probability of observing the same or higher damage state. These points were used to estimate the median ( ) and dispersion ( ) values for each fragility function using maximum likelihood estimation of binomial form with lognormally distributed failures. The results are presented in Table 6 . The functions can be seen in Figure 11 . Table 6 Local scour fragility function parameters for bridges of type A and type B Figure 11 Bridge local scour fragility functions for bridges of (a) type A and (b) type B
Parameters for bridge type
Fragility functions for road section mudflow-blocking
To construct the fragility functions for road section mudflow-blocking, expert data were used from the survey conducted by Winter, Smith [36] and Winter, Smith [37] . Experts assigned probabilities of damage state exceedance to various combinations of pre-determined mudflow volumes and road section categories. Road sections were categorized into high-speed roads and local roads of 500 m each, and four damage states were defined as none ( 0 ), limited ( 1 ), serious ( 2 ), and destroyed ( 3 ) for each of these categories. These damage states were matched to functional capacity losses of no lane closure, partial lane closure, partial lane closure and full closure. Experts also provided information on their level of expertise, which served to weigh their responses.
For every combination of damage state and road category, four expert responses were iteratively and randomly sampled from the survey dataset. A maximum likelihood estimation of binomial form with lognormally distributed failures was performed to determine the corresponding fragility function median and dispersion values for each sampled survey set. A total of 10,000 median and dispersion values were estimated for every combination of damage state and road category. Assuming a lognormal distribution of these resulting values, the median and dispersion values for a fragility function of specific percentile were obtained. The results are presented in Table 7 . The functions can be seen in Figure 12 . Table 7 Mudflow-blocking fragility function parameters for high-speed road and local road sections Note 7.1: As suggested by Shinozuka, Feng [38] , the dispersion value for a fragility function of any percentile is that of a 50-percentile fragility function. Figure 12 Road section mudflow-blocking fragility functions for (a) high-speed roads and (b) local roads
Parameters for high-speed road sections Parameters for local road sections
Functional capacity loss functions for bridge local scour and road section mudflow-blocking
The process proposed by Lam and Adey [18] was used to convert the derived fragility functions into functional capacity loss functions. Expected functional capacity losses were determined as functions of hazard intensities using the derived damage state probabilities and the (illustrative) functional capacity loss values for each damage state shown in Table 8 . These values were either directly obtained or inferred from a survey conducted by D'Ayala, Gehl [15] . The resulting functional capacity loss functions were then used to support the estimation of the time-varying network functional capacity. Table 8 Functional capacity loss used for bridge local scour and road section mudflow-blocking Note 8.1: For each object event, the values presented correspond to the initial functional capacity losses and functional capacity losses during restoration for all damage states (i.e., same values for both types of losses).
Functional capacity loss functions for road section inundation
A negative exponential function was used to model the relationship between inundation depth ( ) and the speed of vehicles on the road ( ). The function is shown in Equation 2, and it was anchored at the maximum feasible speed on any given road (i.e., ), which was determined to be the speed on high-speed road with no inundation. The estimated values of parameter to develop the 95 and 50percentile functional capacity loss functions were estimated to be 0.375 and 0.3 based on a curve fitting exercise using (illustrative) points of reference.
The negative exponential function was used to determine the initial functional capacity loss [ ( )] given an inundation depth for high-speed and local road sections x with a specific speed limit ( ) as seen in Equation 3. In the case of local roads, the initial functional capacity loss could have only been observed when the allowed speed met or exceeded the feasible speed. The resulting 95 and 50-percentile initial functional capacity loss functions are shown in Figure 13 . During the restoration period, the functional capacity loss of a roads section was determined through a comparison between the maximum inundation level experienced ( ) and (illustrative) inundation thresholds ( 1 , 2 ) to determine whether an intervention was required. All of these values are listed in Table 9 . This method, in particular, was a simplification that needs to be revisited in a subsequent analysis. Table 9 Levels of inundation with respect to interventions for road section inundation.
Required intervention
Functional capacity loss during restoration
Cost of restoration and time to restore
The data used to estimate the expected restoration cost and time of bridges affected by local scour and road sections impacted by mudflows are presented in Table 10 . These data were obtained directly or inferred from D'Ayala, Gehl [15] . Following the approach of Lam and Adey [18] , these data were combined with the derived fragility functions to obtain restoration cost and restoration time functions to be used in the risk model. The restoration costs ( ) and times ( ) for inundated road sections were estimated using piecewise functions-each with an exponential function embedded-that related these parameters to inundation depth. For this example, Equation 4 and Equation 5 were used to estimate restoration costs and restoration times using the data in Table 9 and Table 11 .
Bridge local scour
= � 0, < 1 • , 2 ≥ ≥ 1 , > 2 ℎ = � 2 − � � 2 − 1 � = � − 1 � � 2 − 1 � 4 = � 0, < 1 • , 2 ≥ ≥ 1 , > 2 5
Restoration cost Restoration time Symbol
Value (CHF/object) Symbol Value (days/object) 22,000 30 110,000 120 Table 11 Restoration cost and time data used for road section inundation This is an author generated post-print version (also known as "post-refereeing print" and "accepted manuscript") of the article: Lam, J.C., Adey, B.T., Heitzler, M., Hackl, J., Gehl, P. , van Erp, N., D'Ayala, D., van Gelder, P., Hurni, L. (2018). Stress tests for a road network using fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 173, 78-93. 10 .1016/j.ress.2018.01.015.
Note that some differences may be observed as a result of the copy-editing and typesetting process. The final manuscript is available on https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2018.01.015. When citing this work, cite the final manuscript. Note 11.1: Examples of restoration interventions include roadwork to address design deficiencies, debris removal, traffic management measures, and drainage clearance.
Costs of traffic changes
The monetary values placed on an additional hour of travel time by network users was CHF 23.29, and on a missed trip was CHF 20.73 per hour times 16 hours on a given day-it was assumed that network users could miss the opportunity of traveling 16 of the 24 hours in a day. The hourly values were obtained from Schweizerischer Verband der Strassen-und Verkehrsfachleute [39] .
Example results
The estimations for cost of restoration ( Figure 14 ) ranged from CHF 0.45 million to CHF 11.83 million, and had an average of CHF 3.16 million and a median of CHF 2.16 million. The distribution was positively skewed and had a long tail.
Figure 14 Distribution of the estimated cost of restoration for the stress test
The estimations for costs of traffic changes ( Figure 15 ) ranged from CHF 2.90 million to CHF 218.15 million, and resulted in a mixture distribution with two modes. When examining the 100 observations, a jump between CHF 5.17 million and CHF 143.86 million is observed. This meant that while a small number of events-14 observations were equal or less than CHF 5.17 million-may result in damages, these events did not translate into significant traffic changes. In approximately half of these, the cost of restoration was less than CHF 0.85 million, and hence, low costs of traffic changes may be attributed to low level of damages. In the remaining instances, the costs of restoration amount up to CHF 4.36 million. For these cases, the damaged objects were not as critical as other objects with respect to the functioning of the network. For these 14 observations, the ratio between the cost of restoration and the costs of traffic changes averaged 0.477. For the remaining 86 observations, this ratio significantly decreased to 0.019. In the first-mode distribution (Figure 16 ), the cost estimates for traffic changes were slightly positively skewed, unlike the second-mode distribution where the estimates resembled a Gaussian distribution. For the first-mode distribution, the minimum value was CHF 2.90 million and the maximum was CHF 5.17 million. The mean was CHF 3.61 million and the median was CHF 3.46 million. No overall negative effects were observed (i.e., all costs are positive). Although benefits may be obtained in certain parts of the network at specific time steps during the hazard events period and restoration period due to missed trips, and hence, less congested routes, these benefits were far outweighed by the negative impacts in the remaining network and/or other time steps. Figure 16 First-mode distribution of cost of additional travel time and missed trips for the stress test
For the second-mode distribution (Figure 17 ), the minimum cost was CHF 143.86 million and the maximum cost was CHF 218.15 million. The mean was CHF 180.73 million and the median was CHF 177.14 million. The number of days simulated for the 500-year return period events (corresponding to the second mode) ranged from 49 to 149. The minimum cost rate found in this mode was, therefore, CHF 1.15 million per day and the maximum calculated was CHF 3.05 million per day. Parametric and non-parametric approaches can be used to approximate generalized distributions of the probable consequences. For this example, a non-parametric approach was used: distributions were approximated through log-transformed Gaussian kernel density estimates using Silverman's rule of thumb for the selection of the bandwidth (please refer to Silverman [40] for more information). The logtransformation was implemented to avoid obtaining probable negative cost estimates, which would have implied benefiting from the occurrence of a rainfall and subsequent flood and mudflow events when such benefits could not have been possibly obtained. Figure 18 shows the non-parametric distributions related to the restoration of the network and the changes in traffic. The distribution of cost of restoration was positively skewed with a median value of CHF 2.35 million. It had a long tail with the 99-percentile value estimated at CHF 13.54 million. The 1-percentile value was estimated at CHF 0.42 million. As opposed to discretized distributions where the probabilities depend on the discrete cell sizes, density estimates are the result of a smoothing process, where points beyond those observed are assessed, and therefore, an analyst can expect to obtain a different set of probability estimates-please refer to differences in probability values between Figure 14 and Figure 18a .
With respect to the costs of traffic, this difference is more evident-please refer to differences in probability values between Figure 15 and Figure 18b . Furthermore, the density of the costs in the first mode with respect to the density of the costs in the second mode was more prominent in Figure 18b than in Figure 15 , as if the density of the costs in the first mode were overestimated, or the density of the costs in the second mode were underestimated. Neither of these occurred, however. This is the effect of the smoothing process.
Example discussion
The estimated risks related to the restoration of the network and to the traffic changes are shown in Figure  19 . In both cases, the non-exceedance probabilities of the consequence limit were lower than a 95%. The stress test was failed. At that point, however, the network manager could have decided to revise their risk model (i.e., better quantify uncertainty and reduce uncertainty). Such revision should not have targeted changes that support the passing of the stress test-in fact, changes may lead to larger estimated risk [41] . Some possible updates are:
• replacing key sub-models for more sophisticated and precise ones (at a computational expense in some cases),
• integrating data from additional field surveys that identify all bridges prone to local scour (and other types of scour) and characterize them in more detail (e.g., improved parameter distribution definition, improved bridge types, improved pier design description, improved critical levels of scour), • enhancing the modeling of inundated pavements to best relate their functional capacity losses, restoration times and restoration costs, not solely as a function of inundation depth, • harmonizing the collected survey results for functional capacity losses, restoration time and restoration costs, • fitting probability distributions to the probable costs of restoration and the probable costs of traffic changes (as opposed to using Kernel estimates), and • adding other types of hazard and object events that may be triggered by rainfall events.
Figure 19 Stress test evaluation of adequate performance using (a) cost of restoration and (b) cost of traffic changes as consequence indicators
A revision of the risk model could have also occurred when considering the very low non-exceedance probability related to the costs of traffic changes (i.e., 15.9%). The network manager could have concluded (after careful consideration) that such costs were too high, and therefore, that the risk model required a revision.
As a point of comparison, the results when running the model using 50-percentile fragility and functional capacity loss functions are presented in Figure 20 . While the estimated risks were lower than those obtained when using the 95-percentile functions (as expected), when using the same consequence limits to evaluate post-hazard performance, the network manager would still have implemented risk-reducing interventions because the non-exceedance probability related to the costs of traffic was still too low (i.e., 19.3%). If the network manager had originally based the decision to intervene solely on the costs of restoration works, then no interventions would have been implemented since the corresponding calculated non-exceedance probability was above 95%. It is then important for network managers to consider in their decision making processes the consequences absorbed by network users. This comparison also showed that the relationship between direct and indirect consequences was not linear. The difference in non-exceedance probabilities between the conditioned and unconditioned model were 5.7% for the costs of restoration and 3.4% for the costs of traffic changes. In other words, an increase of restoration costs did not necessarily translate into a comparable increase of additional travel time and missed trips costs. Much more work is needed, however, including the analysis of results related to hazard events with other return periods, to best describe such a relationship.
For those interested in alternate visualizations of comparisons between the modeling results obtained when using 50-percentile fragility and functional capacity loss functions and the results obtained when using 95-percentile functions, please see the works of Heitzler, Lam [42] and Heitzler, Lam [43] .
Conclusions
In this paper, a quantitative approach for conducting stress tests on road networks using fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions was presented. It was shown how traditional methods used in modeling the relationship between hazard events and object events can be used to determine if the posthazard network performance is adequate. The probabilistic approach is suitable when evaluating the posthazard performance of temporal and spatially distributed networks knowing that the events that need to be modeled to estimate risk are uncertain and can manifest in different ways over time and space. To demonstrate the application of the approach, an example was conducted for a road network in Switzerland exposed to floods as well as mudflows. The risk model used supported the estimation of probable costs of restoration and traffic changes. Both of these costs were used to determine whether risk-reducing interventions were to be executed. Table 12 summarizes the example.
Category Description
Risk model
Road network was exposed to rainfall-triggered flood and mudflow events, leading to bridge local scour, mudflow-blocked road sections and inundated road sections, network functional capacity losses, restoration interventions and traffic changes (please see Table 2 and Table 3 for more information).
Stress test
The conditions applied to the risk model were:
• 100 simulations of rainfall events with a 500-year return period,
• 95-percentile fragility functions for bridge local scour and road section mudflow-blocking, and • 95-percentile functional capacity loss functions for inundated road sections The evaluation criteria was the following (please see Table 4 for additional details):
• 95% probability that the cost of restoration will not exceed 0.059% of the Canton of Grison's 2016 GDP, or • 95% probability that the cost of traffic changes will not exceed 1% of the Canton of Grison's 2016 GDP Stress test results Risk-reducing interventions would need to be planned and executed given that the estimated non-exceedance probabilities were lower than the probabilities specified in the evaluation criteria. The results were:
• 93.3% probability that the cost of restoration will not exceed 0.059% of the Canton of Grison's 2016 GDP, and • 15.9% probability that the cost of traffic changes will not exceed 1% of the Canton of Grison's 2016 GDP. Developing optimal work programs that include risk-reducing interventions is subject of future work, and so is the evaluation of other network management measures such as increasing emergency funds and enhancing restoration capabilities. Future work in this particular area may be built upon the work of Adey, Lethanh [44] , Fernando, Adey [45] , Lethanh and Adey [46] , and Lethanh, Adey [47] . The evaluation of candidate work programs may also need to consider their likelihoods to succeed or fail [48] .
Category Description Other possible actions
In addition to revising the risk model with the aim to better quantify the uncertainty or reduce the uncertainty (as suggested in the previous section), the network manager can consider:
• reevaluating the decisions that led to the design of the stress test, and determine whether changes to the stress test are warranted (e.g., selecting rainfall events of different return period, increasing the number of rainfall simulations, using fragility functions and functional capacity loss functions of a different percentile), or • conducting additional stress tests that may consider other types of events such as hazard events (e.g., increasing the number of mudflow events) or societal events (e.g., decreasing the number of restoration crews, increasing the number of vehicles driving through the network to account for tourists during specific seasons). Table 12 Summary of example Despite the virtues of the approach presented here, there is still work to be done in the development of stress tests to support network managers in assessing post-hazard performance. Specifically, given the need to determine whether risk-reducing interventions are to be conducted using non-exceedance probabilities for consequence limits, it is necessary to evaluate further parametric and non-parametric approaches to represent the risk distribution. This is of special importance when a limited number of model simulations (i.e., limited number of risk estimations) is conducted given the considerable computational expense of risk models aiming to estimate probable direct and indirect consequences. In such an endeavor, future work has to look at the distribution of probable costs for various periods. Special attention should be given to the adequate representation of the right tails of the risk distributions, where the non-exceedance probabilities of consequence limits will likely be (e.g., probabilities above 90%) by evaluating the fitness of parametric and non-parametric functions in those locations.
On a broader level, future work should focus on investigating which stress tests should be used (e.g., which model conditions) in which situations (e.g., where these tests may yield benefits). This may require giving guidance on how to determine appropriate consequence indicators, consequence limits, and associated non-exceedance probabilities. At an operational level, this investigation may also demand the identification of suitable sub-models for the different types of stress tests and applications. All of these efforts would be conducive to the development of standards for conducting stress tests for networks-an area that is worth exploring to ease the implementation of stress tests in practice. Standards would also support the comparison of stress test results for different networks, bringing additional benefits to network managers (e.g., having the possibility to conduct benchmarking studies, improving the allocation of resources when resources are to be distributed to different networks). At the same time, a transition into a standard-supported environment may translate into enhanced financial protection mechanisms such more conservative amounts of contingency reserves, quicker access to these funds, and higher insurance coverage levels.
